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Abstract—With the globalization of the IC design flow, struc-
tural integrity verification to detect parasitic electrical activities
has emerged as an important research domain for testing the
genuineness of an Integrated Circuit (IC). Sensors like Ring Oscil-
lators (RO) have been proposed to precisely monitor the internal
behaviour of the ICs. In this paper we propose an experimental
analysis of the impact of parasitic electrical activities on the
frequencies of ROs and on the internal supply voltages measured.
Our observations lead us to identify the limits of the usability of
ROs for practical and embedded detection of Hardware Trojans.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the recent trend of outsourcing Integrated Circuit
(IC) manufacturing and design, structural integrity verification
of ICs has become a hot topic. From the specification step to
that of packaging, and especially during the design step, a cir-
cuit can be corrupted by a malicious adversary. This malicious
modification of an IC structure is called a Hardware Trojan
(HT) insertion and its effects can range from performance
degradation (e.g. denial of service) up to more sophisticated
effects like memory dumping, etc. [1].
A HT is composed of two parts, the trigger and the payload.
The trigger is the mechanism that scans specific signals within
the IC until a specific condition is met. When this condition
is met, the payload is then executed. The trigger can either be
generated externally (an external signal or a special external
physical condition) or internally (an internal state of the IC, a
special data configuration, etc). Moreover the trigger can either
be combinational (where the sought condition is the result
of a logical operation on several signals) or sequential (the
triggering of the payload is related to a succession of internal
states). The payload is the ‘malicious effect of the HT. The
payload is ‘explicit’ when signals or logic blocks are directly
added, removed or deactivated. It can also be ‘implicit’ which
is the case when the effect cannot be directly observed like,
for example, the thinning of particular wires. HT detection is a
challenging problem, even after its activation when the payload
is implicit; and it is even more difficult if we try to detect the
HT before its activation. One reason is that the probability of
triggering a HT during functional tests is low and testing is an
expensive approach to that end. Inspecting the circuit through
reverse engineering is also an expensive process in terms of
costs and time which is destructive by nature for the device
under inspection. If this method can guarantee with a high
level of confidence the absence of HT in the de-processed IC, it
doesn’t guarantee at all the absence of HT in all the remaining
ICs that have not been (destructively) inspected. Even though
latest imaging based methods have proven to offer a really
high confidence level [2], the approach is still destructive and
does not cover the entire population of ICs.
Several non destructive methods for detecting HTs have
been proposed since 2007. The first proposed approaches
have suggested to analyze, using statistical techniques, the
overall consumption of an IC to detect the impact of a
HT. For example, in [3], a detection technique based on the
Karhunen-Loe`ve theorem is proposed in order to identify the
power consumption of a HT within process variations and
noise. However, this paper only reports validations obtained
by simulations which unfortunately do not take into account
things like measurement noises. In addition, one may wonder if
a global monitoring of an IC is an adequate solution. Moreover,
the technique may not scale to complex Systems on Chip
(SoC).
In order to enhance the detection capabilities of the pro-
posed techniques, in 2008, the authors in [4] analyze locally the
propagation delays of logical paths using embedded monitors.
However, once again, only simulation results are provided.
In order to improve detection capabilities, [5] proposes to
integrate a hardware system allowing to monitor important
nets of ICs. However, little information is given in this paper
about the efficiency of the proposed technique or on the
associated silicon overhead. In parallel to this approach, a test
solution was also proposed in [6] in order to trigger easily
a HT or at least to increase its electrical activity. In 2010,
to eliminate process variations from the detection problem,
[7] proposes to exploit the strong correlation between the
max operating frequency of an IC, Fmax, and its dynamic
power consumption to detect the presence of an HT. If this
approach is sound, it faces the difficult problem of measuring
Fmax on a SoC. Finally in 2011, the use of Ring Oscillators
(RO) has been proposed to detect HTs. For example, [8] has
provided an analysis of RO sensitivity to the presence of HT
but concludes that it seems difficult to detect really small HT.
At the same time, [9] suggested the use of an array of RO, used
in conjunction with PCA [10] to distinguish infected ICs from
genuine ones. This proposal has been experimentally validated
on FPGA using a Digital Sampling Oscilloscope (DSO) (thus
off-chip) to measure the oscillating frequency of ROs. In 2012,
the proposed idea was also evaluated for a true ASIC [11].
However, the results present a lower success rate than those
reported in [9]. This is may be caused by the use of an
embedded counter to measure the oscillating frequency of RO,
which implies a poor accuracy. That point will be discussed
later. This is the reason why we conducted a thorough analysis
of the use of RO and counters for on-chip Hardware Trojan
detection.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First in
Section II, the conducted experiments and the measurement
setups used are described. The accuracy of the oscillation
frequency of RO is also quantified in this section as well
as the impact of intra-die and inter-die variations based on
measurements done on several boards. In Section III, the
influence of a parasitic electrical activity on the oscillation
frequency of ROs is quantified. To that end, an LFSR, whose
length could be varied between 4 and 64 bits, is used to
mimic the effect of a HT with an electrical activity equivalent
corresponding to that of 2 to 32 D Flip-Flops (DFF). Then
the influence of two main parameters, the electrical activity
amplitude and the physical distance between this activity
and the ROs under measurement, is analyzed experimentally.
From these experiments the value of the internal voltage drop
induced by a parasitic activity is finally inferred. Because
all results of section III were obtained without any normal
electrical activity in the IC, an un-realistic situation with
respect to the operation of an infected IC, all experiments
were repeated with an AES performing a ciphering during
the measurements. The corresponding results are reported in
Section IV. Based on all those results, a discussion about the
use of ROs for embedded Trojan detection is conducted in
Section V, before drawing a global conclusion in Section VI.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In order to analyze precisely the impact of a parasitic
electrical activity on RO’s frequency, a target was designed and
implemented on a Xilinx Spartan-3E 1600E FPGA [12] using
Xilinx tools. It includes a Finite State Machine (FSM), a serial
communication block (RS232) that handles the communication
between the computer and the chip and 14 RO that can be
enabled and measured separately. The FSM and the RS232
are placed far enough from the ROs so as not to influence
them.
The 14 RO are placed as shown Fig. 1 showing the
floorplan of the implemented circuit. This placement was
adopted to allow a spatial analysis of the impact of an electrical
activity on a RO, and more precisely on the supply voltage
distribution in the chip. The 14 ROs have the same design
composed of 4 inverters and 1 NAND2 gate in order to enable
or disable each RO separately. The oscillating frequency (FRO)
of each RO is around 150 MHz depending on the local quality
of the process. To improve the quality of the signal through
the FPGA output pin, each RO is connected to a clock divider
that allows a clean measurement of FRO/2 and hence FRO
(corresponding to a period TRO). The measurements are done
using a DSO from Lecroy with a sample rate of 40 GS/s (25 ps
between 2 samples). In order to get an accuracy of ±0.25 ps
on the FRO/2 measurements, we measured 100 oscillations
of FRO/2 and we repeated the process 100 times in order to
calculate an average value, < FRO >, and a standard deviation
σFRO. Each measurement lasts at most 7 s, in order to keep
the temperature constant. To ensure a stabilized voltage, a DC
power supply with a 0.05 % accuracy was used to directly
power the FPGA core after the removal of the voltage regulator
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Fig. 1. Place and Route of the design on the FPGA’s floor plan
of the board. To generate a parasitic electrical activity, a Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) was placed all around the RO3
as shown Fig. 1. This RO was therefore considered to be at
the coordinates (0,0) during all experiments. This LFSR was
designed in such a way that we could change the word size
between 4 and 64 bits. This was done to mimic a parasitic
electrical activity equivalent to the flipping of 2, 8, 16 and 32
bits in order to analyze the influence of the amplitude of a
parasitic electrical activity during the study.
Prior to any analysis, we first quantified the accuracy
(including all measurement noise sources: circuit, laboratory,
power supply, etc.) of our measurements and the impact of
intra-die and inter-die variations. To that end we measured the
mean value < ∆TR0i > and the standard deviation σROi of
the different ROs and this was repeated for several boards.
Fig. 2 gives the RO periods for two different boards only to
ease the reading. It shows that there are significant inter-die
and intra-die variations which are responsible of changes in the
RO periods of more than 100 ps. However, the most important
point drawn from Fig. 2 is that the standard deviation of our
measurements (independently of the considered board) varies
from one ring oscillator to another on a range between 2.5 and
3.7 ps.
III. IMPACT OF A PARASITIC ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY ON
< TROi >
The impact of a parasitic electrical activity on the period
of a RO is analyzed using the experimental set-up described
previously. This analysis is done according to two main
parameters. The first one is the amplitude of this electrical
activity. The second one is the distance between the RO and
the location of the parasitic electrical activity.
Fig. 2. Estimated (measured) values of < TROi > and σROi for two
different Spartan3E-1600
A. Amplitude of the parasitic electrical activity
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the mean, < TRO9 >, of the
period measured from RO9 with respect to the amplitude of
the parasitic electrical activity expressed in terms of switching
bits (and more precisely switching DFF). Fig. 4 shows the
difference, ∆ < TRO9 >, between the period measured with
and without parasitic electrical activity for RO9. As shown,
< TRO9 > increases linearly from 13.892 ns up to 13.897 ns
with the amplitude of the parasitic electrical activity. This
linear increase is due to the parasitic electrical activity as
highlighted in Fig. 3 which shows that ∆ < TRO9 > also
increases linearly from 0 to 5 ps, i.e. only 0.043% of the
< TRO9 >. This value is very small compared to the effect
of process variations, even intra-die ones, whose effect can
reach 500ps on this board. However, the RO9 is relatively far
from the parasitic source. Let us analyze what happens on RO
closer from the parasitic electrical activity.
B. Distance between RO and the parisitic electrical activity
To study the behaviour of the other ROs, we analyzed
the impact of the distance between the parasitic electrical
activity and the ROs on the latter’s frequencies. Fig. 6 shows
two cartographies of ∆ < TROi > obtained with two different
Spartan3E-1600 devices for a parasitic equivalent activity
equivalent to the switching of 32 DFF (LFSR configured to
Fig. 3. Evolution of < TRO9 > w.r.t. to the amplitude of the parasitic
electrical activity
Fig. 4. Evolution of ∆ < TRO9 > w.r.t. to the amplitude of the parasitic
electrical activity
work on 64 bits). The distance unit of these cartographies is the
slice which was estimated to have a height equal to ∼ 120µm
according to the number of slices (along X and Y) embedded
in these devices and to their dimensions (measured using a
microscope after chemical removal of the package).
As shown in Fig. 6, for RO3 placed right in the middle of
the parasitic activity, the increase of its period is only of 8 ps.
For the farthest ROs (RO1, RO6 and RO14) the influence is of
about 5 ps. This value seems to be the minimum effect of the
parasitic electrical effect; effect which is distributed over the
whole device. This trend is confirmed by Fig. 5 that gives a
projection of the two cartographies along Y axis (see Fig. 1 for
the orientation). These results suggest that a parasitic electrical
activity has a global effect (5 ps) on the power network of the
device but also has a slightly more pronounced local effect
(8 ps).
Nevertheless, these results also suggest that the effect of
the switching of 32 DFF on the RO’s oscillation frequency is
extremely small for the ROs (5 ps) furthest from the parasitic
electrical activity as for the closest ones (8 ps). This is reassur-
ing since these results reflect the fact that the power/ground
networks are designed to be as little resistive as possible in
Fig. 5. ∆ < TROi > versus distance along Y axis for two different devices.
order to avoid the occurrence of important voltage drops that
can compromise the timing constraints. Hence this shows that
the induced voltage perturbation is global and with very low
amplitudes.
Another interesting point highlighted by these experimental
results is that the influence of the parasitic electrical activity on
the ROs period (∆ < TR0i >) is relatively constant at a given
distance from the activity. This means that its effect seems to
be relatively independent of the intra-die variations, and this is
confirmed on the Fig. 6. This observation might be the starting
point for new Trojan detection methods that would be naturally
immune to process variations.
C. Parasitic electrical activity and internal supply voltage
In order to evaluate the effective voltage near each RO,
we characterized the sensitivity of a RO to its supply voltage.
This was done with a DC power supply with an accuracy of
0.05 % and for a voltage range of [1.19 V, 1.2 V], considering
that the circuit’s nominal voltage supply is 1.2 V. Fig. 7 shows
the evolution of the mean oscillation period < TROi > against
Vdd, the supply voltage.
As expected, the period decreases linearly (−14ps/mV)
with Vdd on this small voltage range. From there, we made a
cartography of the voltage drop induced by a parasitic activity
equivalent to the switching of 32 DFF. This cartography is
represented in Fig. 8. It shows the maximum voltage drop is
reached at the parasitic activity’s source location with a value
of 0.5 mV. This voltage drop decreases as we move away from
the parasitic activity with the distance with a minimum value of
0.25 mV. These values are far below the values considered, at
the design stage, when applying corner analyses during static
timing analyses (±10% of Vdd).
IV. IMPACT OF A PARASITIC ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY ON
TROi IN AN AES
Until now, we experimentally studied the impact of a
parasitic electrical activity on the RO’s oscillation period and
on the internal supply voltage. This impact can be observed
using measurements made with a high sampling rate Digital
Storage Oscilloscope (DSO). However, this impact remains
Fig. 6. Cartographies of ∆ < TROi > for two different Spartan devices
low relative to the effects of the intra-die and inter-die varia-
tions. This study was conducted on a circuit without normal
computing activity and hence does not accurately reflect the
reality and in particular the effect of a hardware trojan whose
trigger activity is synchronized by a part of the circuit. The
previous measurements were repeated with an AES (placed
in the neighbourhood of the structure shown Fig. 1) running
in parallel. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) used is
a hardware implementation of the NIST encryption standard
specified in [13]. Moreover, the LFSR (as a HT) is clocked
with a clock net of an AES register.
Fig. 9 shows the cartographies of ∆ < TROi >, obtained
from two different Spartan3E-1600 devices with the AES
Fig. 7. Evolution of the < TROi > w.r.t. to the supply voltage value Vdd
Fig. 8. Cartography of the voltage drop induced by a parasitic electrical
activity equivalent to the switching of 32 DFF (LFSR 64 bits)
running in parallel. The first observation is that the figures
with AES (Fig. 9) and those without AES (Fig. 6) are quite
similar. As it can be seen, ∆ < TROi > varies between ∼ 5ps
and ∼ 8ps with respect to the distance from the parasitic
electrical activity. The average impact of the HT (of the
parasitic electrical activity) on the RO is therefore not altered
at all by the activity of the AES. This is compliant with
the superposition principle in linear systems. However, we
noticed that the AES activity increases the dispersion of the
TROi measurements resulting in an increase of the standard
deviation σROi from ∼ 3ps to ∼ 9ps. Consequently, the AES
computing activity imposes to do more precise estimations
(measurements) of the < TROi > values. In practice this can
be achieved with more measurements (for example 200 oscilla-
tions instead of 100). These considerations prompt to examine
the issues of integrated measurements, measurements that are
done with a reduced sampling rate 2 GS/s for high speed
circuits) compared to those measurements done with modern
Digital Storage Oscilloscopes (40 GS/s up to 120 GS/s).
V. DETECTING TROJANS WITH RO AND COUNTERS
The results presented above show that an electrical activity
equivalent to an 8-bit (resp. 32-bit) switching activity increases
Fig. 9. Cartographies of ∆ < TROi > for two different Spartan devices
the oscillation period by ∼ 3ps (resp. ∼ 8ps) through the
induction of a 0.5 mV voltage drop. Because these values are
really small, one can question the relevance of the choice of
the couple (RO,counter) as an efficient sensor for integrated
HT detection. Indeed, regardless of the oscillation period of
the RO, the duration of the measurements (of the counting)
that allows capturing an oscillation period drift of 5ps would
be too high to be realistic. Hence one needs to ensure that
measurement conditions are stable and that the measurement
duration is compatible with the computing times of the func-
tional blocks embedded in ICs. Also, the measurement time
can be high compared to the active period of the HT’s trigger.
In order to clarify this point, we estimated the required number
of clock cycles (with a period of TCK) needed to measure a
drift of 3ps. We used the following formula:
n =
p · TCK
∆TRO
(1)
with p being the difference between the number of rising
edges counted in the presence of the HT and that counted
without the HT, this value must be high enough regarding
the fluctuations induced by the measurement noise. In our
case for TCK = 20ns (the FPGA design runs at 50 MHz)
and ∆TRO = 3ps we obtain: n = 6667p. The counter must
be enabled during 6667 clock cycles (resp. 666 700 ) to mea-
sure a counter difference of 1 (resp. 100 ). This represents
a measurement time of 133 µs (resp. 13.3 ms) for one RO.
During this period the experimental conditions have to remain
stable. Based on such values, it seems hard to use the couple
(RO,counter) to make an integrated method for HT detection.
It appears that we need reliable sensors with a much more
important sensitivity to local variations of the supply voltage
for efficient and embedded HT detection techniques.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper describes experiments conducted in order to
answer two questions. The first is relative to the effect a HT
on the ICs internal voltage and delays. The second is relative
to the use of the couple (RO,counter), as a tool for embedded
HT detection. With regard to the first question the experimental
results show that the effect of Hardware Trojans on the supply
voltage and delays are significantly below the effect of process
variations. As a result, concerning the second question, too-
high on-chip sampling rate values, or too long measurement
times, are therefore required in order to capture the timing
degradation induced by HT using RO. The couple (RO,counter)
is not an adequate choice for embedded Hardware Trojan
detection. ROs can be used if their frequencies are measured
using off-chip DSOs. For completely on-chip solutions, sensors
with higher sensitivity to supply voltage variations must hence
be sought.
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